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COMMENTS
SUBSTITUTE COUNSEL'S ACCESS TO WORK PRODUCT OF
DISQUALIFIED COUNSEL
A court will disqualify an attorney from representing a client in
litigation that bears a substantial relation to the attorney's repre-
sentation of a former client, when the former client is an adverse
party in the current litigation.' If the party moving for disqualifica-
tion establishes this substantial relation, a court will presume that
the attorney could use confidential information received from the
former client during the previous attorney-client relationship to the
former client's detriment in the present controversy 2 This presump-
tion is irrebuttable. In enforcing the attorney's disqualification
from representation adverse to a former client, the court has the
discretion to frame protective orders to ensure that no confidential
information will prejudice the former client.4
In a question of first impression presented in First Wisconsin
Mortgage Trust v. First Wisconsin Corp.,5 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit held that this irrebuttable pre-
sumption of prejudice does not apply to a situation involving access
by substitute counsel to the work product of the disqualified coun-
sel.6 Rather, the court determined that trial courts should adopt a
1. See, e.g., Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978); Schloet-
ter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1976). See generally Note, The
Second Circuit and Attorney Disqualification - Silver Chrysler Steers in a New Direction,
44 FORD. L. REv. 130 (1975) (change in standard of proof for substantial relation test); Note,
Attorney's Conflict of Interests: Representation of Interest Adverse'to That of Former Client,
55 B.U.L. REv. 61 (1975) (general discussion of purpose of disqualification and standards for
voluntary withdrawal by an attorney); Note, Unchanging Rules in Changing Times: The
Canon of Ethics and Intrafirm Conflicts of Interest, 73 YAmz L.J. 1058 (1964); Note,
Disqualification of Attorneys for Representing Interests Adverse to Former Clients, 64 YALE
L.J. 917 (1955) (genesis of substantial relation test). Most of the issues involving the substan-
tial relation test have arisen in the Second Circuit.
2. Government of India v. Cook Indus., Inc., 569 F.2d 737, 740 (2d Cir. 1978); Fred Weber,
Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 566 F.2d 602, 608 (8th Cir. 1977); Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Armco Steel
Corp., 559 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1977); Akerly v. Red Barn Sys., Inc., 551 F.2d 539, 544 (3d
Cir. 1977); Schloetter v. Railoc of Indiana, Inc., 546 F.2d 706, 710 (7th Cir. 1976).
3. Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973).
4. IBM Corp. v. Levm, 579 F.2d 271, 279 (3d Cir. 1978).
5. 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978).
6. Id. at 204. The court considered the irrebuttable presumption to be an "automatic
exclusion" of work product. Id.
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flexible approach based upon a review of all the pertinent facts of
the case in determining whether the work product of a disqualified
counsel carries the taint of confidential information or grants an
otherwise unfair advantage.7
The Seventh Circuit in First Wisconsin ignored the fundamental
purpose of disqualification. In preventing the use of confidential
information imparted to an attorney during the attorney-client rela-
tionship, disqualification serves to uphold both the confidence of a
client in his attorney and the confidence of the public in the integ-
rity of the bar. The decision attempted to resolve questions of access
to work product by proposing a test which involved an investigation
of the potential existence of confidential information in the work
product. Courts, however, uniformly have avoided such an inquiry
Instead they have applied the irrebuttable presumption of prejudi-
cial use of confidential information, based on the rationale that the
possibility of abuse of confidential information is too great to allow
continued adverse representation by an attorney This Comment
will consider these issues and will propose an alternative to the
problem of access by substitute counsel to work product of a dis-
qualified attorney
FIRST WISCONSIN MORTGAGE TRUST v FIRST WISCONSIN CORP
In First Wisconsin, the defendant banking corporation sponsored
a real estate investment trust. The bank's general counsel drafted
the papers creating the trust and became general counsel for the
trust. In addition, the general counsel drafted agreements for the
bank to advise the trust on prospective loans and participation
agreements covering those loans made by the bank and the trust.
The general counsel handled negotiations between the trust and
the bank when defaults occurred on some loans. The general counsel
eventually recommended that the trust hire special counsel to repre-
sent the trust in these negotiations while the general counsel han-
dled the same negotiations for the bank. The special counsel for the
trust threatened to file suit against the bank for breach of fiduciary
duty m advising the trust on the loans. In preparation against such
a suit, the general counsel compiled, from files open to both the
bank and the trust, analyses of three hundred loans made by the
7. Id. at 202, 209.
308 [Vol. 21.307
ACCESS TO WORK PRODUCT
trust. The general counsel spent one year producing these analyses,
which constitute the work product in question. While generating
this work product, the general counsel resigned as general counsel
to the trust."
When the threatened suit was filed, the general counsel for the
bank sought the consent of the trust in representing the bank in the
litigation. The trust denied its consent and moved instead for dis-
qualification of the general counsel.' Fifteen months later, the trial
court in granting the motion for disqualification found a substantial
relation between the general counsel's original representation of the
trust and the current litigation. The current litigation centered on
allegations that the bank had failed to disclose pertinent informa-
tion to the trust regarding its investments, that the bank had consti-
tuted the trust improperly, and that the bank had breached its
contractual duties to the trust. The court found a substantial rela-
tion between representation of the trust and the current litigation
in the fact that the general counsel had drafted the agreements
between the bank and the trust and had been present at meetings
between the bank and the trust at which the bank advised on loans
to be made by the trust. 0
Substitute counsel for the bank then moved for permission to use
the loan analyses prepared by the general counsel in order to defend
the bank in the suit. The trial court denied the motion, reasoning
that access to the loan analyses would defeat the purpose of the
initial disqualification of the general counsel." The court deter-
mined that the irrebuttable presumption of prejudicial use of confi-
dential information instrumental in disqualification decisions
should apply with equal force to the question of access to work
product.2
8. Id. at 202-03. Although in 1974 the parties nearly settled the problems over loan defaults
which led to litigation, the general counsel resigned from representing the trust in September,
1974. The general counsel's attorneys compiled the work product during most of 1974 and
early 1975. The trust filed suit against the bank in March, 1975. Id.
9. The disqualification motion was decided in First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis.
Corp., 422 F Supp. 493 (E.D. Wis. 1976).
10. Id. at 496-98.
11. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 74 F.R.D. 625 (E.D. Wis. 1977). The
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmedin a panel decision at 571 F.2d 390 (7th Cir. 1978).
After a rehearing en banc, the Seventh Circuit affimed in part and reversed in part. 584 F.2d
201 (7th Cir. 1978).
12. 74 F.R.D. at 627. The trial court stated:
[I]t is precisely the importance of this work product to the representation of
1979] 309
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The Seventh Circuit reversed, holding that the protection of con-
fidential information of a former client did not mandate automatic
preclusion of access to the work product of the disqualified attorney;
on the contrary, trial court discretion required a thorough review of
the facts to discover whether the work product contained the taint
of confidential information. 3 The court ordered the transfer of the
work product of the disqualified counsel to the substitute counsel
for the bank on the ground that the trust had not asserted that the
work product contained confidential information, and that the work
product seemed ministerial in character.
THE SUBSTANTIAL RELATION TEST: DEVELOPMENT AND PURPOSE
Analysis of the Seventh Circuit's decision in First Wisconsin must
begin with a description of the role of the "substantial relation" test
in resolving questions of attorney disqualification. In T C. Theatre
Corp. v. Warner Brothers Pictures, Inc.,"4 the District Court for the
Southern District of New York used the substantial relation test to
decide motions for disqualification in which an attorney represented
a client in litigation adverse to a former client. The attorney had
represented a motion picture company in an action charging that
motion picture manufacturers had conspired to restrain trade na-
tionwide in the distribution of motion pictures."z The plaintiff in
T C. Theatre, who was represented by the same attorney, alleged
that the defendant motion picture company formerly represented by
that attorney had conspired to restrain trade in motion pictures.
The defendant moved for the disqualification of plaintiff's counsel
on the ground that the claims asserted by the plaintiff were based
on charges substantially identical to those asserted in the previous
litigation in which plaintiff's counsel had represented the defen-
dant. Additionally, the defendant alleged that the plaintiff's attor-
ney had obtained confidential information during his previous rep-
the defendant's interests that places its proposed use by substitute counsel in
direct violation of the purpose behind disqualification; that is, the preservation
of the confidence of the former client given in the context of the fiduciary
relationship he forged with his attorney.
Id.
13. 584 F.2d at 209.
14. 113 F Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
15. Id. The previous suit had involved restraint of trade. The attorney had represented one
of the defendants, and had drafted proposed findings of fact and a decree. The same motion
picture company was a defendant in T.C. Theatre. Id.
310 [Vol. 21:307
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resentation of the defendant. Rather than requiring proof that the
matters in the previous suit were substantially identical to the mat-
ters of the present suit or that the client actually disclosed confiden-
tial matters to the attorney during the previous representation, the
court decided that parties moving for disqualification must show
only a substantial relation between the subject matter in the two
representations. Such a substantial relation existed when a court
could determine that, during the prior representation, the attorney
might have acquired confidential information related to the subject
of the subsequent representation. 8 Thus, the test depended upon
the likelihood of the acquisition of relevant confidential information
by an attorney during the course of the previous representation.
Although the court did not characterize the degree of proof neces-
sary to support a finding of substantial relation, it nevertheless
disqualified the attorney in question even though the issues in T C.
Theatre and the previous representation were not identical.
In reaching its decision, the district court relied upon Canon 6 of
the American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics, which
concerns the obligation to represent a client with undivided loyalty
and to maintain his secrets or confidences. The opinion expresses
the fear that a contrary holding would destroy the integrity of the
attorney-client relationship inasmuch as the client would eschew
full disclosure to his attorney if he suspected that confidential infor-
mation could be used against him in later litigation. 8 The court in
16. Id. at 269. Substantial relation is a deceptive term. The operative inquiry is not
whether the issues in the two representations are substantially related, but whether the
attorney might have acquired, during the former representation, information related to the
subject matter of the subsequent representation. Thus, a substantial relation is proven by a
showing of potential access to confidential information by an attorney. In United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 136 F Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y. 1955), a motion for disqualification failed when
the movant did not show access by an attorney to documents substantially related to a
subsequent representation.
17. 113 F Supp. at 268. Canon 6 states: "The obligation to represent the client with
undivided fidelity and not to divulge his secrets on confidences forbids also the subsequent
acceptance of retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest
of the client with respect to which confidence has been reposed." Id. The Canons of Profes-
sional Ethics, adopted in 190S, served as the precursor of the modern Code of Professional
Responsibility.
18. 113 F Supp. at 268-69. In this context, the Third Circuit has stated:
[A] client should be encouraged to reveal to his attorney all possibly pertinent
information. A client should not fear that confidences conveyed to his
attorney in one action will return to haunt lm in a later one. It is readily
apparent that if an attorney is permitted to reveal confidences "the free flow of
1979]
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T C. Theatre ruled that once a movant for disqualification proves a
substantial relation, a court should assume confidences were dis-
closed and should not inquire into their nature or extent. Such an
inquiry would force revelation of matters actually entrusted to the
attorney 9 and would entail a serious breach of the attorney-client
relationship. The court accepted evidence of access to confidential
information through prior representation to prove a substantial rela-
tion. Relying on public policy and on the client's interest in confi-
dentiality, the district court decided that a presumption of use of
confidential information was imperative after a finding of substan-
tial relation."
In Eme Industries, Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,2 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit applied the substantial relation test within
the framework of the Code of Professional Responsibility 22 The de-
fendant Patentex moved for disqualification of plaintiff's counsel
because the attorney had defended Patentex in an action fifteen
years earlier. One issue in the prior suit, the ownership of Patentex,
had become an issue in Emle. Patentex contended that the attor-
ney could use confidential information derived from this prior repre-
sentation to the detriment of Patentex. The court discussed the
need to balance a client's right to counsel of his choice with the need
to maintain the highest standards of professional responsibility In
this context, both Canon 44 and Canon 95 of the Code of Profes-
information from client to attorney, so vital to our system of justice, will be
irreparably damaged."
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1384 (3d Cir. 1972), citing United States
v. Standard Oil Co., 136 F Supp. 345, 355 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
19. 113 F Supp. at 269.
20. Id. The court cited In re Boone, 83 F 944 (N.D. Cal. 1897), as support for the proposi-
tion that the public interest in preserving attorney-client confidences and secrets in certain
circumstances may be too great to allow waiver by the client.
21. 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973).
22. The Code of Professional Responsibility, adopted in 1969, consists of Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. The Canons are general statements from which the
Ethical Considerations and the Disciplinary Rules derive. The Ethical Considerations suggest
the ideal for a lawyer, whereas the Disciplinary Rules constitute the mandatory minimum
required of lawyers.
23. The attorney actually had represented the owner of Patentex, not Patentex itself. The
issue of the ownership of Patentex, and the owner's control over Patentex, were collateral to
the main issue, the validity of a patent. 478 F.2d at 565-68.
24. Canon 4 states: "A lawyer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." ABA
CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 4.
25. Canon 9 states: "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impro-
priety." ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS No. 9.
[Vol. 21:307
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sional Responsibility were implicated. 21 Canon 4, which embodies
the principle of attorney-client confidentiality, promotes the free
flow of information between attorney and client. Noting that litiga-
tion is inherently subtle and complex, the Second Circuit reasoned
that an attorney could not avoid the pitfalls either of abusing confi-
dential information acquired in an earlier representation or provid-
ing inadequate representation as a result of self-imposed restramt.Y
The proscription by Canon 9 of even the appearance of impropriety
further reinforced the effect of Canon 4.2
The combination of Canons 4 and 9 thus became the basis for the
substantial relation test. The court deemed a strict prophylactic
rule necessary to prevent any possibility, however slight, that confi-
dential information acquired from a client during a previous repre-
sentation could be used against that client by his former attorney
in subsequent litigation.29 In addition to reaffirming the substantial
relation test and its requirement of proof,3" the court imposed the
mandate of Canon 9 so that any possibility of use of confidential
information adverse to the attorney's former client provided suffi-
cient grounds for disqualification. 31
In Silver Chrysler Plymouth v. Chrysler Motors Corp. ,32 the Sec-
26. 478 F.2d at 565. The court emphasized:
[W]e may not allow [the attorney] to press these claims against Patentex if,
in doing so, he might employ information disclosed to him in confidence during
his prior defense of [Patentex's owner]. Such a result might work a serious
injustice upon [his client] and would tend to undermine public confidence in
the Bar. Thus, even an appearance of impropriety requires prompt remedial
action by the court.
Id.
27. A lawyer's good faith, although essential in all his professional activity, is never-
theless an inadequate safeguard when standing alone. Even the most rigorous
self-discipline might not prevent a lawyer from unconsciously using or manipu-
lating a confidence acquired in the earlier representation and transforming it
into a telling advantage in the subsequent litigation. Or, out of an excess of good
faith, a lawyer might bend too far in the opposite direction, refraining from
seizuing a legitimate opportunity for fear that such a tactic might give rise to
an appearance of impropriety. In neither event would the litigant's or the pub-
lic's interest be well served.
478 F.2d at 571.
28. See note 27 supra. "[A] lawyer should avoid representation of a party in a suit against
a former client where there may be the appearance of a possible violation of confidence, even
though this may not be true in fact." ABA Comm. ON PROFESSIONAL ETMICS, OPINIONS, No.
885 (1965).
29. 478 F.2d at 571.
30. See note 16 supra.
31. The court purported to apply the same test as in T.C. Theatre, but added the language
of Canon 9.
32. 518 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
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ond Circuit imposed a more demanding standard for proving possi-
ble access to confidential information. The plaintiff's attorney had
worked formerly for Chrysler's counsel, but not on the particular
matters at issue in the suit.3 The court stated that the substantial
relation test should entail an inquiry into all the facts and circum-
stances to determine whether the attorney had a reasonable possi-
bility of access to confidential information. Disqualification in the
absence of a realistic chance that confidential information was im-
parted would go far beyond the purpose of disqualification deci-
sions.34 That purpose consisted of the need to enforce the lawyer's
duty of absolute fidelity to his client and the need to guard against
the inadvertent use of confidential information. Insisting that a
blanket approach was unnecessary to uphold Canons 4 or 9, the
court of appeals required instead a thorough examination of the
facts of each case. The court noted that most disqualification deci-
sions were for patently clear relations.15 The standard of proof of a
substantial relation, which in Emle involved any possibility what-
soever of use of confidential information, was altered by Silver
Chrysler Plymouth to a reasonable possibility of use of confidential
information.36 Subsequently, the same court in Government of India
v. Cook Industries, Inc. ,3 divided the substantial relation test into
two parts: whether the issues in the two representations were sub-
stantially related and whether the attorney's involvement in the
prior representation was such that he was reasonably likely to have
had access to confidential information. Issues were substantially
related when the relationship between the two representations was
patently clear.3
33. Id. at 752. The former representation by the attorney, an associate of a large law firm,
had consisted mostly in work on one antitrust suit for Chrysler, whereas the subject of Silver
Chrysler was an alleged breach of a lease. Id. at 752, 756.
34. Id. at 757. The court feared the effect upon the job prospects of young attorneys who,
after working as associates on purely legal matters for a large firm, could face clients of the
same large firm in litigation. Refusing to believe that the law should impute automatically
knowledge of confidential information to all attorneys of a firm, the court preferred to apply
a rebuttable inference. Id. at 753-54.
35. Id. at 754.
36. The court made no attempt to distinguish Emle because it cited Emle as a disqualifica-
tion for representation on two sides of an identical issue. The court did reformulate the
standard of proof for a substantial relation from slight possibility, as in Emle, to "patently
clear." Id. at 754-55.
37. 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978).
38. The Second Circuit stated that "[the court will grant] disqualification only upon a
[Vol. 21:307
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One part of the substantial relation test has remained constant
since T C. Theatre. Once a party moving for disqualification has
proven a substantial relation, the court invokes an irrebuttable pre-
sumption that confidential information was used or would be used
to the prejudice of the attorney's former client." The courts have
differed only on the formulation of the quantum of proof needed to
prove a substantial relation." In varying this formulation, the courts
have attempted to balance the conflicting interests of the two
clients and the public.41
SEPARATE TREATMENT OF DISQUALIFICATION AND ACCESS TO WORK
PRODUCT
Underlying Policies: Client Confidence v. Potential Prejudice
The majority in First Wisconsin refused to apply the irrebuttable
presumption of use of confidential information to the work product
of an attorney disqualified under the substantial relation test, even
though that presumption applied to the actual representation by
the disqualified attorney Declining to follow the general precedent
for disqualification, the Seventh Circuit suggested that the question
of access to work product of disqualified counsel merited a different
analysis than disqualification itself. Concomitantly, the court re-
jected the argument that access to work product constitutes contin-
ued representation by the disqualified counsel."
showing that the relationship between issues in the prior and present cases is 'patently
clear' Put more specifically, disqualification has been granted or approved recently only
when the issues involved have been 'identical' or 'essentially the same."' Id. at 739-40 (cita-
tions omitted).
39. See, e.g., Hull v. Celanese Corp., 513 F.2d 568 (2d Cir. 1975); Emle Indus., Inc. v.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973); T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,
113 F Supp. 265 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
40. See Cannon v. U.S. Acoustics Corp., 398 F Supp. 209 (N.D. Ill. 1975). The substantial
relation test is the measure of the quantum of evidence required for proof of the allegation of
use of confidential information. Id. at 223-24.
41. See Government of India v. Cook Indus., 569 F.2d 737 (2d Cir. 1978), in which
the court recognized the clash in policies:
[W]e are mindful that there is a particularly trenchant reason for requiring a
high standard of proof on the part of one who seeks to disqualify his former
counsel for in disqualification matters we must be solicitous of a client's right
freely to choose his counsel - a right which of course must be balanced against
the need to maintain the highest standards of the profession.
Id. at 739 (citations omitted).
42. The trial court had asserted:
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 21:307
The majority cited E.F Hutton & Co. v. Brown43 in noting that
courts previously had considered the question of disqualification
and the question of subsequent protective orders separately In
Hutton, the plaintiff sued its former vice-president for negligence
and breach of fiduciary duty in lending funds with the stock of a
certain corporation as collateral. The defendant moved to disqualify
Hutton's counsel because of previous dealings between Hutton's
counsel and himself. Hutton's counsel had questioned the vice-
president about his involvement in the loan, prepared a memoran-
dum, and kept it on file. Additionally, Hutton's counsel had ap-
peared at SEC hearings with the vice-president, and failed to cor-
rect the Commission's impression that Hutton's counsel was per-
sonal counsel for the vice-president. Although Hutton could prove
that its counsel had received no confidential information from the
defendant," the district court refused to admit that evidence and
proceeded to disqualify the attorney Recognizing the customary
protection afforded to confidential information, the court neverthe-
less insisted that the attorney-client relationship itself demanded
similar treatment." Disqualification of Hutton's counsel depended
To attempt to divorce work product from representation would
be an absurd proposition. To the contrary, the defendants realize the im-
portance of [the] work product to the representation of their interests in this
lawsuit. However, it is precisely the importance of this work product to the
representation of the defendants' interests that places its proposed use by sub-
stitute counsel in direct violation of the purpose behind disqualification; that
is, the preservation of the confidence of the former client given in the context
of the fiduciary relationship he forged with his attorney.
First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 74 F.R.D. at 627.
43. 305 F Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969).
44. Hutton's counsel asserted he had told the vice-president that he would report to Hutton
everything the vice-president related to the counsel. Additionally, everything that the vice-
president knew about the loan was known to Hutton as a matter of law. In the court's view,
however, the receipt of confidential information was not a prerequisite to disqualification. Id.
at 392.
45. The court asserted the following distinction:
[T]he basis for the rule against representing conflicting interests is broader
than the basis for the attorney-client evidentiary privilege. The evidentiary
privilege and the ethical duty not to disclose confidences both arise from the
need to encourage clients to disclose all possibly pertinent information to their
attorneys, and both protect only the confidential information disclosed. The
duty not to represent conflicting interests, on the other hand, is an outgrowth
of the attorney-client relationship itself, which is confidential, or fiduciary, in a
broader sense. Not only do clients at times disclose confidential information to
their attorneys; they also repose confidence in them.
Id. at 394 (footnotes omitted).
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upon a demonstration of a substantial relation. Such a finding,
however, was based on the confidence of the client in his attorney,
rather than on the possibility of use of confidential information
discussed in First Wisconsin.6
The defendant in Hutton also moved, on the basis of attorney-
client privilege, to enjoin Hutton's counsel from handing ouer its
memoranda of conversations with the defendant to the substitute
counsel. In its denial of the motion, the court held that no such
privilege existed with respect to the files because the defendant had
obtained the information as an officer of the corporation; therefore,
Hutton already knew the information contained in the memoranda
as a matter of law 1, The court in First Wisconsin concluded that
Hutton supported its holding of a different rule for access to work
product because Hutton treated disqualification and access to work
product with completely distinct analyses.
Hutton, however, was concerned less with a substantial relation
than with determining whether the appearance of Hutton's counsel
with the vice-president constituted representation of the vice-
president. Inasmuch as Hutton could show that its attorney pos-
sessed no confidential information, the disqualification rested not
on the possibility of use of such confidential information, but upon
the breach of loyalty to the client and the destruction of his confid-
ence in his attorney Such considerations naturally are more general
than the possibility of use of confidential information. In contrast,
the disqualification in First Wisconsin depended not only upon gen-
eral considerations of the duty of undivided loyalty, but more im-
portantly upon the danger of use of confidential information." The
main question in First Wisconsin, therefore, was not whether the
prior representation was actually representation, as in Hutton, but
whether a substantial relation existed.
46. A strict rule that preserves a client's confidence in his attorney by disqualifying an
attorney even if he could prove that he had received no confidential information and the
difficulty in determining whether the attorney had actually gained confidential information
led to the disqualification in Hutton. Id. at 395.
47. The disqualification in Hutton stemmed from the preservation of confidence of a client
in his attorney, rather than the danger of use of confidential information; therefore, the court
devoted little attention to the question of access to the memoranda of Hutton's counsel by
substitute counsel. Id.
48. First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 422 F Supp. at 496-98. The ruling of
disqualification depended upon a minute examination of the details of the relation between
the prior and subsequent representations.
1979]
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The majority opinion in First Wisconsin also relied upon Allied
Realty, Inc. v. Exchange National Bank." In that case, the Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit based its disqualification decision
upon the rule that a lawyer who has investigated or passed upon a
matter while in public employment should refuse private employ-
ment in connection with the matter." The defendants in Allied
Realty moved for an order enjoining both the use by anyone of any
evidence, knowledge, or information examined or obtained by the
disqualified counsel, and the commencement of any action against
the defendant based upon pleadings prepared by the disqualified
counsel.
In refusing to adopt the proposed protective order, the Eighth
Circuit noted that the purpose of the rule upon which it had based
disqualification was to prevent the attorney from using public office
for private gain. Disqualification alone served that purpose; no pro-
hibition against disclosure of information was necessary simply be-
cause no confidential information was involved. This result was
offered by the court in First Wisconsin as support for separate treat-
ment for disqualification and access to work product questions.
Clearly, however, the court in Allied Realty analyzed disqualifica-
tion and access to work product differently because the disqualifica-
tion in that case did not result from the possibility of use of confi-
dential information. Inasmuch as the disqualification in First
Wisconsin depended upon the possibility of use of confidential infor-
mation, the precedential value of Allied Realty is dubious.
Finally, the majority in First Wisconsin relied upon IBM Corp.
v. Levin,5 in which the plaintiff sued IBM for restraint of trade.
Before and during the pendency of the suit, plaintiff's counsel, a
large law firm, had represented IBM in labor law matters. IBM
moved for disqualification of plaintiffs counsel shortly before trial.5 2
49. 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969).
50. Id. at 1101. "A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public
employ, should not after his retirement accept employment in connection with any matter
which he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." ABA CODE OF
ETHics No. 36. The attorney had assisted in the preparation and trial of a case against the
defendant in which the government attempted to show a mortgage transaction. The plaintiff
in Allied Realty, represented by the attorney, sued to set aside the same mortgage as fraudu-
lent. 408 F.2d at 1100.
51. 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978).
52. Id. at 274-75. The plaintiff Levin filed suit in June, 1972. IBM moved to disqualify
plaintiff's attorney in June, 1977, three months before trial. Id. BM first learned of the dual
representation in January, 1977. Id. at 277.
[Vol. 21:307
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Though no substantial relation existed between the matters of the
suit at hand and the counsel's representation of IBM, the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit nevertheless disqualified the counsel
based on the duty of an attorney to give his undivided loyalty to his
client. 3
IBM also had moved for denial of access to the work product of
plaintiff's attorney by substitute counsel. Noting the discretion of
the trial court in framing sanctions in order to balance the conflict-
ing interests of the parties involved, the Third Circuit reasoned that
disqualification rested upon a vindication of the integrity of the bar,
and not upon the use of confidential information. Therefore, the
plaintiff could have access to the work product of his disqualified
attorney. 4
Recognizing that IBM was not squarely on point but ignoring the
reason for disqualification in IBM, the Seventh Circuit in First
Wisconsin noted the different analyses of disqualification and ac-
cess to work product. 5 Disqualification in IBM, however, involved
no danger of any use of confidential information; rather, the appear-
ance of impropriety and the duty of the attorney to give his undi-
vided loyalty to his client were implicated. 6 That duty reflects a
policy to preserve the confidence of the public in the integrity of the
bar and the confidence of clients in their attorneys. Canon 4, as
implicated in First Wisconsin, involves similar interests, but is more
specific in that it seeks mainly to prevent the use of confidential
information against a former client. Seizing upon the treatment in
IBM of disqualification and access to work product, the majority in
First Wisconsin analyzed access to work product in terms of the
practical effects upon the client of the disqualified attorney while
disregarding the potential harm to the client whom the disqualified
attorney formerly represented.
53. Id. at 279-80. The court continued: "We think, however, that it is likely that some
'adverse effect' on an attorney's exercise of his independent judgment on behalf of a client
may result from the attorney's adversary posture toward the client in another legal matter."
Id. at 280. "An attorney who fails to observe his obligation of undivided loyalty to his client
injures his profession and demeans it in the eyes of the public." Id. at 283.
54. "Here the district court ameliorated the harsh effect upon the plaintiffs of its sanction
against [the attorney] by permitting the turnover to substitute counsel for the plaintiffs
within sixty days of the past work product of [the attorney] on the case." Id. at 283.
55. 584 F.2d at 208.
56. See note 53 supra.
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Harmful Effects of Automatic Dental of Access
The majority in First Wisconsin refused to apply the irrebuttable
presumption of use of confidential information to the work product
of a disqualified attorney, even though the presumption would
apply to the question of representation itself. 7 Insisting that the
question of access to work product of disqualified counsel merited a
different analysis than disqualification itself, the court refused to
limit its perspective solely to the purposes of disqualification. The
rationale of the court for the separate analysis of the access to work
product question lay in its concern for the client whose attorney was
disqualified and the general repercussions of extending an irrebutta-
ble presumption of use of confidential information to the work prod-
uct of the disqualified attorney 11
The majority cited IBM v. Levin for the proposition that disquali-
fication served mainly as a vindication of the integrity of the bar.
One practical effect of disqualification was that it constituted a
sanction against the attorney The Seventh Circuit, however, re-
garded the denial of access to the work product of a disqualified
attorney as a sanction against the client rather than the attorney 11
The client would have to pay the costs of duplicating the work
product, regardless of whether the attorney had used confidential
information in compiling the work product. In First Wisconsin, in
which fifteen attorneys had labored on the work product in question
for an entire year, the expense of duplicating the work product was
substantial.
Disqualification, however, is also a sanction against the client.
The client must find substitute counsel and familiarize him with the
litigation factually as well as legally The client suffers a delay in
the final resolution of the litigation, yet must continue to comply
57. Id. at 204.
58. The court cited the following "undesirable results" engendered by the inflexible appli-
cation of disqualification of work product: destruction of disqualified counsel's work; elimina-
tion of trial court discretion; obstruction of the administration of justice; added financial
burden to the client of disqualified counsel; and increased public dissatisfaction with the
judicial system. Id. at 208-09.
59. Id. The disqualification of the attorney can prevent the attorney from collecting any
more fees in the litigation. If the attorney serves as general counsel, as in First Wisconsin,
his effectiveness and value to his client diminishes. The automatic denial of access to the work
product of disqualified counsel, however, does not harm the attorney further, in that the
attorney has nothing more to lose.
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with discovery requests. 0 The difference in the effect upon the client
of denial of access to work product, as contrasted with disqualifica-
tion itself, lies in the duplication of work product. The difference,
then, is less one of substance than of degree.
The court in First Wisconsin feared also that automatic denial of
-access to work product could delay litigation for an indeterminate
period.' Insisting that the progress of the litigation must be contin-
uous, the court faced the problem that the client of disqualified
counsel must participate in pretrial matters such as settlement ne-
gotiations and discovery The client still would have to appear at
depositions, answer interrogatories, and comply with requests for
admissions. This hardship can be rectified easily by the trial court
by framing a protective order to give the client time to find new
counsel and educate him on the state of the litigation.
The court feared that automatic exclusion of the disqualified
counsel's work product would prevent attorneys from compiling
work product and would cause a moratorium on work by the attor-
ney subject to disqualification during the pendency of the motion.
Thus, a party could use a disqualification motion as an offensive
weapon.6" The loss in morale by both the attorney and the client is
obvious. Recognizing that growing business and legal complexities
increase the possibility of disqualification motions, the court indi-
cated that upon a motion for disqualification, the attorney fre-
quently would be compelled to decide whether to defend his integ-
rity or mutely withdraw 63 The court asserted that no attorney who
is charged with impropriety should be forced to resign if he in good
60. The motion for disqualification in First Wisconsin took fifteen months to decide, during
which time the movants submitted interrogatories that the general counsel answered.
61. 584 F.2d at 205. Presumably, if an attorney anticipates that the court might disqualify
him and therefore automatically deny access by substitute counsel to his work product, he
might stop work on all aspects of the litigation, particularly discovery, until the disqualifica-
tion motion is resolved. If the attorney informs his client of the possible consequences of
disqualification, such as automatic denial of access to work product, the client might insist
that the attorney halt work and thereby, further delay the progress of the case.
62. Id. at 206. A party could move for disqualification shortly before trial, perhaps years
after the complaint was filed. If the client, whose attorney was then disqualified, had to pay
for years of work product, as well as have his substitute counsel duplicate the work product
under pressure, the adverse consequences could be enormous. Correspondingly, the tempta-
tion inherent in the strict disqualification rules to use such motions as offensive weapons is
magnified if the work product is excluded automatically. See Woods v. Covington County
Bank, 537 F.2d 804 (5th Cir. 1976).
63. 584 F.2d at 206.
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faith denies the charge; on the contrary, the attorney has a duty to
defend himself and his client vigorously
Logically, however, an automatic disqualification of an attorney
can have the same effect as an automatic denial of access to work
product. An attorney could be forced to abandon the actual repre-
sentation in order to defend a motion for disqualification. An attor-
ney disqualification motion similarly could be used as an offensive
weapon. The zeal of an attorney could be impaired as easily by his
own disqualification as by the automatic disqualification of his work
product. Clearly, the deleterious impact of a motion for disqualifica-
tion affects the client as well as the attorney
The court agreed that the logic of an irrebuttable presumption of
use of confidential information extended to all facets of representa-
tion, although the plaintiff in First Wisconsin had objected to no
access by substitute counsel other than to work product. That work
product entails continued representation applies similarly, though
perhaps with less force, to depositions, evidence, and pleadings. If
confidential information possibly could exist in work product, then
it could exist in the choice of questions at depositions, in the sub-
mission of requests for admissions, or in the basis for the pleadings.
Ultimately the logic of banning access by a substitute counsel to all
facets of representation could result in striking the pleadings.64
While the court in First Wisconsin expressed its fears of the pract-
ical effects of an automatic denial of access to work product by
substitute counsel and concentrated upon the perceived sanctions
against the client, it sidestepped the policies which had led to an
irrebuttable presumption of use of confidential information in dis-
qualification cases by citing cases in which the danger of such use
was remote or nonexistent. 5 Courts previously had recognized the
64. See Allied Realty, Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1969). The
movant for disqualification sought to extend disqualification to evidence examined by the
disqualified attorney, any pleadings based upon information of the disqualified attorney, and
the complaint actually prepared by the attorney. Id. at 1102. See also Doe v. A Corp., 330 F
Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd sub nom., Hall v. A Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972)
(per curiam). The plaintiff had acquired the information on which the suit was based while
acting as attorney for the defendant corporation. In addition to disqualifying the plaintiff and
his co-counsel, the court enjoined the plaintiff and the co-counsel from acting as counsel in
any litigation based upon the same information or from disclosing the information to the
stockholders of the defendant corporation. Finally, the complaint was dismissed and the case
file was sealed.
65. See E.F Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 307 F Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969) (disqualification
for previous representation, but no danger of use of confidential information); Allied Realty,
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harm posed by disqualification to a client, particularly to his free
choice of counsel, but had insisted that the equities favored both the
previously represented but now adverse client and the public inter-
est in the integrity of the bar.6" The courts in those cases decided
that the policy which encourages clients to confide freely in their
attorneys outweighed the primarily financial burdens placed upon
the client whose attorney was disqualified." Those decisions based
the substantial relation test upon the preservation of the appear-
ance of propriety and the protection of the confidential information.
of the former client. Ignoring these grounds for the substantial
relation test, the court in First Wisconsin viewed disqualification as
a penalty against the attorney and a vindication of the integrity of
the bar. Thus, First Wisconsin completely changed the focus of
disqualification in addition to its formulation of a different analysis
for the question of access to work product.
Faced with conflicting policies and harmful practical effects, the
court in First Wisconsin decided that no presumptions should apply
to the issue of substitute counsel's access to the work product of a
disqualified attorney The court rejected the argument that work
product constituted continued representation by disqualified coun-
sel. Trial courts were directed to view all of the pertinent facts in
Inc. v. Exchange Nat'l Bank, 408 F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 823 (1969)
(disqualification for representing plaintiff in same issues for which attorney had represented
federal government); IBM Corp. v. Levin, 579 F.2d 271 (3d Cir. 1978) (disqualification for
subsequent representation not substantially related to prior representation of the adversary).
66. E.g., Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 564-65 (2d Cir. 1973) in which
the court carefully scrutinized the countervailing policies involved:
We approach our task as a reviewing court in this case conscious of our responsi-
bility to preserve a balance, delicate though it may be, between an individual's
right to his own freely chosen counsel and the need to maintain the highest
ethical standards of professional responsibility. This balance is essential if the
public's trust in the integrity of the Bar is to be preserved. Moreover, we are
mindful that ethical problems cannot be resolved in a vacuum. To affirm the
order [of disqualification] below will deprive plaintiffs of highly qualified
counsel of their own choosing and may foreclose [the attorney's] participation
in future actions brought against [the defendants]. There can be no doubt,
however, that we may not allow [the attorney] to press these claims if
he might employ information disclosed to him in confidence during his prior
defense of [the defendants]. Such a result would work a serious injustice upon
[the defendants] and would tend to undermine public confidence in the Bar.
Id.
67. See note 65 supra.
68. Id.
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the context of each case to determine whether any taint of confiden-
tiality or other improper advantage actually was gained from the
dual representation. Although it suggested an in camera examina-
tion to determine the actual taint, the court otherwise articulated
no procedure that would assure that no taint of confidential infor-
mation or otherwise unfair advantage exists in the work product. "
The majority also acquiesed in an alternate formulation suggested
by the dissent that a court should deny access to work product if a
reasonable possibility of use of confidential information existed in
the work product itself or in its creation. Thus, two tests appeared
in the majority opinion: one that rested upon the possibility of the
use of confidential information and one that relied upon a showing
of actual use of confidential information or otherwise unfair advan-
tage.
Possible Use v. Actual Use: Test Application
Although the majority did not examine the work product in ques-
tion, it relied on affidavits of disqualified counsel that stated that
no confidential information appeared in the work product, and as-
sumed that the work product was purely ministerial. 0 Noting that
the litigation already had been delayed substantially, the majority
permitted substitute counsel to have access to the work product.
Thus, the majority, in failing to investigate the work product for
possible taint, simply ignored its own test.
In applying the second test, the possibility test, the majority
noted that the plaintiff, whom the bank's disqualified counsel had
represented before the suit, had never contended that confidential
information had been used by the disqualified counsel in connection
with the work product.71 Inasmuch as the trust was in the best
69. 584 F.2d at 211 n.6.
70. The work product was ministerial in that any attorney who had not previously repre-
sented either client could have compiled the work product. Id. at 203-04.
71. Id. at 210. The majority apparently based its assumption of an absence of confidential
information in the work product on the failure of the trust to contend that the disqualified
general counsel had used confidential information in the work product. In oral argument,
however, the trust explained that it had based its argument on the automatic exclusion of
disqualified counsel's work product after disqualification. The trust further stated that the
disqualified counsel had not used confidential information in the evidentiary sense of the
attorney-client privilege, but had used confidential information in the context of secrets -
that information which, if divulged, would be detrimental to the client. Clearly, the majority
ignored the contentions of the trust that confidential information existed in the work product.
Id.
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position to know whether the general counsel possibly had used
confidential information in the work product, the majority con-
cluded that no possibility of use of confidential information existed
in the work product. The court simply stated that the work product
was ministerial, finding support for its belief in the trust's failure
to either rebut the contention of ministeriality or express any fear
that the work product contained confidential information.
The dissent also applied the possibility test, speculating upon the
various possib lities of confidential information in the work prod-
uct.7 2 The dissenting opinion implied that the presumption of use
of confidential information, which courts apply after a finding of
substantial relation, should decide the question of access to work
product of disqualified counsel. 3 As a result of the presence of the
general counsel at meetings between the trust and the advisers from
the bank, the dissent discerned a possibility that the general counsel
knew the reactions of the trust plaintiff to the advice on the loans
given by the bank defendants. If the general counsel was privy to
those reactions, he could have placed that presumably confidential
information in the work product. The dissent also stated that the
general counsel could use such knowledge to determine what facts
in the loan files were important and thereby direct the substitute
counsei in his representation of the bank. Moreover, the dissent
asserted that the possibility of use of confidential information in the
creation of the work product would allow the substitute counsel to
discern an emphasis upon particular facts and impressions in the
work product.7' Although the substitute counsel therefore could de-
rive unfair advantage from access to the work product, the limited
perspective afforded a judge by in camera proceedings might pre-
vent him from discerning the confidential information in the work
product or its creation.75 The suggestion of the majority regarding
72. Id. at 218 (Castle, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Objections to the possibil-
ity of confidential information in the work product did not extend to the possibility of confi-
dential information in the discovery materials and the pleadings. Id. at 216-17 n.8.
73. Id. at 218. The dissent asserted: "It should be unnecessary in applying Canon 4 to
speculate as to the specific confidences which may have been used by disqualified counsel."
Id.
74. Id. The substitute counsel could also rely to a great extent on the work product with
the knowledge that someone with confidential information prepared the work product. Id,
75. Id. Substitute 'ounsel would have time to pore over the work product whereas a trial
judge, in the limited time available to him and in view of a huge amount of work product,
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the use of in camera proceedings to discover confidential informa-
tion in the work product was therefore impractical, as well as con-
trary to the policy of protecting the actual, confidential informa-
tion .7
Relying on these speculations, the dissent would have held that
whereas the trial court acted improperly in automatically applying
an irrebuttable presumption of use of confidential information in
work product generated by disqualified attorneys, nevertheless the
denial of access to work product was correct because the possibility
of use of confidential information in the work product or in its crea-
tion was too great.77 The dissent acknowledged that disqualification
attenuated the danger of use of confidential information somewhat,
but insisted that the test for whether a reasonable possibility of
confidential information exists in the work product should be the
same as the substantial relation test.78
The dissent, however, sought to render the possibility test rebutt-
able. The finding of a possibility of use of confidential information
in the work product depended upon a finding of reasonable possibil-
ity of access to confidential information. Essentially this embodies
the substantial relation test. 9 In practice, however, the quantum of
evidence necessary to prove a reasonable possibility of access to
could skim only portions of the work product in an attempt to discern the use of confidential
information in the work product.
76. See, e.g., T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 113 F Supp. 265, 269
(S.D.N.Y. 1953).
77. 584 F.2d at 217. The dissent also would have denied access to the work product purely
upon the basis of Canon 9. Noting that Canon 9 does not require actual proof of impropriety,
the dissent queried whether reasonable members of the public would view access to predis-
qualification work product as improper, and if so, whether the benefit of permitting such
access outweighs the harm to the public trust. In First Wisconsin, the appearance of impro-
priety according to the dissent outweighed the financial loss to the client whose attorney was
disqualified. Id. at 220.
78. Id. at 215. The dissent noted:
IT]he purpose of presuming the possession of confidences in disqualification
cases is that once a former attorney-client relationship in a substantially related
case is established, the possibility of confidential information being used against
the former client is too great to allow continued representation. The issue has
always been one of whether counsel had the opportunity to obtain and use
confidences, not whether specific confidences were actually used. Consequently,
the question here should be whether the physical removal of counsel from the
case, while leaving his work product, eliminates or greatly lessens the possibility
of confidential information being used against his former client.
Id.
79. See note 16 supra.
326
ACCESS TO WORK PRODUCT
confidential information by the attorney sought to be disqualified,
could render the same result in determining whether an attorney
had a reasonable possibility of access to confidential information
which could appear in the work product. The dissent depicted a
situation m which an attorney who had previously represented a
client ,oined a firm mn representing a client adverse to the attorney's
former client after the work product had been produced. 0 The dis-
sent would disqualify the attorney and his firm, but would not deny
access to the work product.8 ' Therefore, the dissent would not deny
access to work product which was irrelevant to the question of dis-
qualification. Any other work product, however, presents the danger
of transmitting confidential information which, however remote,
should be averted by the disqualification of the work product.
Test Viability
By its unsubstantiated assumption that no taint of confidential-
ity existed in the work product, the majority enunciated a test with
little substance." The majority also confused the test to determine
whether confidential information actually inhered in the work prod-
uct with the test to determine whether confidential information
possibly could inhere in the work product.8 The decision implied
that the possibility of confidential information in the work product
must be less remote than the facts of First Wisconsin indicated in
order to deny substitute counsel access to the disqualified counsel's
work product. 4 Hence, the standard for finding a possibility of use
of confidential information is indistinct at best.
80. 584 F.2d at 216.
81. Id.
82. Although the majority demanded flexibility on the part of the trial court in determining
the facts and framing an appropriate remedy for access to work product of disqualified
counsel, it resolved the issue in First Wisconsin simply on the basis of an assumption that
no confidential information existed in the work product and a fear of the adverse repercus-
sions which might ensue from an automatic disqualification. Thus, the majority failed to
observe its own standards.
83. To prove the existence of confidential information in work product, a movant would
have to show actual confidences. To prove the possibility of confidential information in work
product, the movant would have to show that by extrinsic facts, confidential information
could reasonably be said to be in the work product.
84. Not only did the general counsel's representation of the trust bear a substantial relation
to the matters of the litigation in First Wisconsin, but the litigation turned upon the contrac-
tual duties of the bank defendant which the general counsel had defined. Therefore, the
relation was not merely substantial, but identical.
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In recommending the use of in camera proceedings, the majority
adopted a procedure that the courts in disqualification proceedings
uniformly have avoided. If the courts adopt in camera proceedings
to determine whether work product actually contains confidential
information, then the party moving for denial of access to work
product by substitute counsel would have to reveal the very confid-
ences he wishes to keep secret. This situation presents the substan-
tial risk that the trial judge inadvertently might use the same infor-
mation in making rulings during the trial. Moreover, a judge might
be unable to ascertain the existence of confidential information in
the work product. Consequently, in camera proceedings are unwork-
able and belie the purpose of disqualification itself.
CONCLUSION
First Wisconsin fails to elucidate for the trial judge or the attorney
the quantum of evidence necessary to prove the use of confidential
information in the work product of an attorney disqualified under
Canon 4. The majority based its decision on its fear of the deleter-
ious practical effects of disqualification upon the client. In so rea-
soning, it neglected the history of and rationale for a Canon 4 dis-
qualification. The dissent also erred in applying the presumption of
use of confidential information without giving much weight to the
hardships that denial of access to work product imposes upon the
client whose counsel is disqualified.
The appropriate resolution should begin with a recognition of the
policies of the preservation of public and client confidence. The trial
court should balance those policies in the light of the facts of the
particular case before it, without relying upon rigid presumptions.
Instead, the court should balance the weight of the evidence, the
effect of a decision upon the two clients and, finally, upon the pub-
lic. Such an approach would preserve the discretion of the trial
judge, whose ruling should be binding except in instances of obvious
abuse. Inasmuch as the public interest represents a third interest
in such a balance, it could serve as the decisive factor favoring either
access or denial of access to the disqualified attorney's work prod-
uct.
The trial judge should assess a case in terms of the relative possi-
bility of use of confidential information by looking to such factors
as the size of a law firm, the particular attorney or attorneys who
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have personally represented the previous client, and the attorneys
who have actually compiled the work product. The question of hard-
ship to the client of a disqualified attorney, should be evaluated in
terms of the delay in litigation, the opportunity for re-creation of the
work product, and the amount of added expense. If the court finds
that the danger of the possibility of use of confidential information
is great, and the effect of denial of access to work product minimal,
then it should deny access to work product. If the trial judge finds
the danger of possibility of use of confidential information remote,
as in First Wisconsin, and the effect upon the client of denial of
access to work product great, access to the work product should be
permitted. In closer cases, the trial judge must use both his knowl-
edge of the case and the interest of the public to decide the issue of
access. Of course such a balancing process is vague inasmuch as the
possibility of access to confidential information is not susceptible to
measurement. The balancing process, however, would enable the
trial court to take into account the myriad nuances of a case, includ-
ing the willful tardiness of a party in moving for disqualification.
Ultimately the attorney, rather than the litigants, is in the best
position to avert the dilemma posed by disqualification. Usually an
attorney can recognize readily the danger of conflict between his
past and present representations; therefore, the attorney should in-
form the client of that danger and its potential consequences. This
duty should be enforced by stringent sanctions, including the possi-
bility of a malpractice action by the client against his neglectful
attorney In this way, much of the irresolvable debate over access
questions could be avoided.
S.M.G.
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